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In loving memory of the late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Who taught us that laws and precedents 
can and should evolve overtime 
to better society as a whole, 
and discrimination, by any means, 


































The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how law reform toward gender equity has an impact on 
economic growth in Arab countries in the Middle East. Personal status law reform granting 
women economic, social, and personal freedoms is spreading across the region and showing 
substantial change. Using case studies of major PSL reforms in Tunisia and Morocco, this thesis 
outlines qualitative and quantitative evidence to support the case that gender equity benefits the 
economic growth of the given country. 
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1. Introduction 
“When I hear people say a rising tide lifts all boats, I say wait a minute. People are in 
different boats – one is going upstream and the other downstream. And the answer is 
not about getting people to paddle harder. It’s about putting people in the same river.” 
- Dr. Amani Nuru-River 
The United Nations 2019 Human Development Report focuses on inequality in all 
dimensions of human development. It is titled, “Leaving No One Behind: Towards Inclusive 
Citizenship in Arab Countries,” and opens with the UN’s pledge to “help states to achieve all 17 
Sustainable Development Goals by the year 2030.” Throughout the growing conflict across the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is expected that, without intervention, 40% of people 
in the region will live in crisis and conflict conditions by 2030. The people in this region are at 
risk of insecurity, injustice, and violence from any of the following forces of exclusion: 
discrimination, geography, governance (ineffective, unactive, or corrupt governance), 
socioeconomic status, and shocks and fragility (resilience to disasters: both natural and man-
made).1 These forces make it difficult for a person or a people to exercise their rights as citizens. 
This paper focuses on only one force of exclusion: Discrimination. Specifically, 
discrimination between gender in Arab countries as outlined in FIGURE 1.1.2 While there is 
some debate over the definition of “Arab countries,” this thesis will use the term to refer to 
countries which primarily speak Arabic and have a shared culture and history. Women in Arab 
countries only 85.5 percent of men’s human development gains as measured by the UN Gender 
Development Index. Middle East and North African culture clearly distinguishes gender roles 
 
1 Adel Abdellatif, Paola Pagliani, and Ellen Hsu. “Towards Inclusive Citizenship in Arab Countries,” n.d., 48. 
2 “The Arab Human Development Report: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.” Choice Reviews Online 
44, no. 12 (August 1, 2007): 44-6583-44–6583. 
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and expectations in society, leaving 50% of the population constantly affected by discrimination 
because they are women. 
FIGURE 1.1 Gender Inequality UNHDP 2019 
Gender discrimination is common in Arab countries, specifically regarding citizenship rights: In 
only 3 Arab countries can women pass their nationality to their spouse and children, in 7 
countries they can pass it to their children but not their spouse, and in the remaining 11 countries 
they cannot do either. Arab women have 50% less opportunities than men to have a financial 
account. Legislation on domestic violence and paid maternal leave also cause constraints for 
women that do not affect men. So if in a country, women are not allowed to formally hold a job 
or maintain a bank account, it is plausible that their service and money in the informal market is 
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not participating in the national economy and therefore not actively supporting the gross 
domestic product.3 
Knowing the gender disparities in civil law in many Arab countries, I wonder if this form 
of gender inequity has an impact on economic growth. I am analyzing how laws and policies 
regarding a citizen’s identity that differ on the basis of sex affect the economic growth of all 
citizens in a country, in order to investigate the relationship between gender equity and economic 
growth in the Arab World. I hypothesize that a positive shift in gender equity via personal status 
reform would influence a positive shift in a nation’s economy: 
Personal Status Reform → Gender Equity → Economic Growth 
Suppose we select a country with a substantial reform of Personal Status Law toward gender 
equity, we would look for a correlating statistically significant change in Gross Domestic 
Product per capita. Thus this thesis will work to answer the question: What is the relationship 
between personal status law and economic growth in Arab countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa? 
Chapter 2 analyzes the relationship between civil laws and the economy on a broad scale. 
I utilize scholarly arguments to form a foundation of my research of a possible correlation. In 
Chapter 3, I establish my argument within existing literature and use theoretical evidence to 
support gender equity as a causal mechanism between personal status law and economic growth. 
Chapter 4 details the quantitative and qualitative methods by which I intend to investigate my 
question as well as why these are the methods of best fit. I also select my case studies for 
analysis. 
 
3 Abdellatif, Adel, Paola Pagliani, and Ellen Hsu. “Towards Inclusive Citizenship in Arab Countries,” n.d., 48. 
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Chapter 5 investigates existing data on GPDpc over time in my case studies. I use Stata 
software to p-test for a statistically significant shift in economic growth. Therefore, in Chapter 6 
I analyze these results as well as the PSL reforms in cases that may relate to the possible shifts. 
Finally in Chapter 7, I summarize my findings and define the role of my research in the academic 
discourse. I also address the limitations of my research and shortcomings in my argument, 
methodology, and data. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Economic Impact of Laws 
While there is some existing literature on the economic impact of changes in civil laws, 
each example has different circumstances that allow for a broader understanding as a literature 
review. I was able to take varied cases of law reform and social change to investigate the 
common trends in the resulting economic change. There is no perfect formula, but this research 
gives a strong baseline for the expected results of my study. 
The most recent and expansive research on law and economic growth is, “The Role of 
Law in Economic Growth: A Literature Review,” by Guangdong Xu. Xu defines four categories 
that can directly impact economic growth: Geography, Trade, Culture, and Institutions. Each of 
these can greatly affect, positively or negatively, a country or people’s economic growth, but no 
one definitively determines the future alone. Growth will not occur unless individuals are lured 
by incentives to undertake social productive activities.4 
Xu’s most impactful point is his argument for the importance of the malleability of 
institutions, citing the greater capability of common law over civil law to propel economic 
 
4 North, D.C. and Thomas, R.P. (1973) The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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growth. “The main difference between the two systems is that in common law countries, case 
law — in the form of published judicial opinions — is of primary importance, whereas in civil 
law systems, codified statutes predominate.”5 Laws and the public’s “buy in” of laws support 
economic development and creativity. Common law countries, like the US, protect investors, 
shareholders, and creditors. It is thought that common law is an advantage to financial markets 
which can stimulate economic growth. Most of the countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
practice civil law and do not alter norms overtime through judiciary acts without written 
amendments of laws. Xu exemplifies the importance of the law’s ability to affect economic 
growth, without directly focusing on one group of people within an economy. This leads to the 
ultimate baseline of my research, as common law allows for progress concurrent with change in 
social norms, while these Arab countries must wait for a written PSL reform following a societal 
change. I draw the conclusion that it is the passing of these PSL that expand women’s equity that 
brings about the economic growth, and conversely, the lack of these PSL reforms are invisible 
road blocks on their economic ladder.6 
BenYishay and Betancourt’s article, “Civil Liberties and Economic Development,” 
explores the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index and how it compares and contrasts the 
relationship between rights and economic prosperity. They use a conceptual framework of rights 
and responsibilities as an essential part of economic success to discuss the “rule of law” as an 
influencer to empower “secondary human rights” such as housing, employment, university 
education, property rights, geography, and human capital. The authors compare the civil liberties 
of freedom and expression of belief, organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy 
 
5 Syam, Piyali. “What Is the Difference Between Common Law and Civil Law?” What is the Difference Between 
Common Law and Civil Law? - Blog | @WashULaw, January 28, 2014. 
6 Xu, Guangdong. "The role of law in economic growth: a literature review." Journal of Economic Surveys 25, no. 5 
(2011): 833-871. 
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and individual rights against economic factors such as GDP, difference in income level, 
evolution of economic activity, and population. 
 The end result of the comprehensive study is that all civil liberties are statistically 
significant at the same level as the traditional economic indicators on economic growth. The 
personal autonomy and individual rights subcategory had the highest t-ratio of any of the other 
institutional variables studied, which “evaluates the extent of personal economic freedoms such 
as the choice of ownership form, employment, residence and education, as well as social 
freedoms such as choice of marriage partners and family size.”7 This high level of statistical 
significance shows potential for my proposed research question. 
Institutionalism does not seem to corollate to per capita income across the 60 countries 
studied, but property rights do corollate regardless of how that indicator is measured. The 
measures that performed best in examining economic growth were the secondary human rights 
as well as primary right, not civil liberties alone. The authors also looked at geography of 
populations, specifically latitude, and they considered whether a country was land locked. This 
dimension of data was used to capture access to markets and infrastructure costs. They 
considered the malaria ecology index and gross school enrollment ration as an explanatory 
variable in the measure of human capital. The study suggests that the higher level of ethnic 
fractionalization in society, the level of human capital decreases. This measure, ethnic 
fractionalization, is based on the availability of education. 
The addition of the human rights variables, whether secondary or primary, all contribute 
to economic growth with statistical significance. Interestingly, the human capital variable renders 
the constraints on the executive model insignificant regardless of geography variables, which 
 
7 BenYishay, Ariel, and Roger R. Betancourt. "Civil liberties and economic development." Journal of Institutional 
Economics 6, no. 3 (2010): 281. 
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could potentially be influenced by an empowered electorate to increase economic viability. 
When human capital and human rights variables along with institutional variables are added to a 
predictive model, they enhance the explanatory power of the data, while the geographical 
variables contribute to a lesser extent.8 
The study suggests that the prevalence of the rule of law through civil liberties remains a 
dominant predictor of economic development, regardless of correction for reverse causation. 
They find a correlation between economic growth and the rule of law, without declaring 
causation. The authors conclude that when secondary human rights exist, in addition to primary 
rights, economic growth seems probable. As a country or group attains a higher level of 
economic development, civil liberties have a larger impact on further growth. 
While racial advance in the US does not parallel cultural advance in the Middle East, the 
effect of policies on economic growth of certain parties can exemplify common trends in 
different societies. In “Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on 
the Economic Status of Blacks,” Donohue and Heckman explore the changes in the labor market 
and social outcomes of blacks following the 1964 Civil Rights Act. They also acknowledge that 
some changes could be delayed from 1954’s Brown v Board, or affected by 1962 and 1965 
Voting Rights Acts. 
The compilation of the authors’ research was less conclusive than we would hope, 
suggesting they had difficulty empirically measuring the economic data of federal pressure for 
equity. The systemic change following the passing of laws was slow, and generally resulted in 
more laws without influential change felt by the people.9 While it is clear that there was legal and 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 Donohue III, John J., and James Heckman. Continuous versus episodic change: The impact of civil rights policy on 
the economic status of blacks. No. w3894. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991. 
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systemic growth toward racial equity, it was slow and full of setbacks. This may bare a relation 
to the slow economic growth for blacks in the US, but this article conveys no conclusive 
correlation or causation, which would not support the hypothesis that PSL reforms influence 
economic growth. 
2.2. Personal Status Law 
Personal Status Law i.e. Islamic PSL, Shariah Law, Moudawana, Marriage and Family Law, 
Personal Code, Civil Law, Social Contract Law 
Personal Status Law can be defined as a set of privileges, obligations, powers, and 
restrictions that a person has as declared by legislation. For the purpose of this paper, we use the 
term Personal Status Law to regard all of the legislation that defines a person’s legal rights in all 
Arab countries, understanding that the chosen indicators may be categorized under different 
legislative sectors depending on how the law is written in a given country. So while the listed 
terms do not have the same definitions, they may be interchanged for the sake of this paper. 
Sharia law is not codified and therefore left to the interpretation of a nation-state, which leads to 
the disparity between countries in PSL especially as defined for women.10 Ideally, a country that 
has remained fairly stable throughout the refugee crisis with clear PSL reforms and possesses 
GDP data both before and after the change in PSL would make the best possible case study. 
2.2.1. Indicators: The following are some of the many possible indicators for Personal 
Status Law. These were chosen because they tend to differ by gender and can be analyzed for 




10 Charrad, Mounira M. 2011. "Gender in the Middle East: Islam, State, Agency." Annual Review of 
Sociology 37, 417-37. 
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(a) Marriage 
PSL regarding marriage can determine a person’s legal age to marry, the ability to choose 
marriage (give oneself away), and the right to a dowry. It can also determine roles in a family, 
often defining men as the family leaders, while women are caregivers and must be dutiful and 
subservient. These roles can lead to men determining when and where his wife can go, if she can 
be educated and what activities are appropriate. 
(b) Divorce (including Child Custody) 
PSL regarding divorce can determine a spouse’s right to initiate divorce, to maintain child 
custody, and to receive financial support following a divorce. PSL can also differ in valid 
rationale for initiating a divorce, as well as legally obtaining a divorce, with the laws for men 
tending to be quite simple and those for women more onerous.11 
(c) Legal status 
Rights based on one's status, specifically the ability to vote and to hold office. 
(d) Mobility 
PSL can restrict a person’s ability to travel domestically alone, to move to a new home alone, the 
ability to drive, and the overall freedom of mobility. Managing restrictions on a woman’s 
mobility may transfer from the father, or male guardian, to the husband – causing a woman to 
require permission to travel for work, family duties, education or social interactions. 
(e) Citizenship 
PSL can define and in many cases limits the ability to pass on citizenship to a spouse and/or 
children. Therefore a child born and lived their whole life in a country may not be a citizen of 
that country depending on the country’s PSL and the parent’s nationalities. 
 
11 Islamic jurisprudence according to the four madhahib, vol. 4, The book of marriage and divorce, 2nd ed. (Beirut: 
Dar Alkotob Alelmiyah, 2002), 56-9. 
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(f) Financial Rights 
PSL can define disparate rights between genders and for women limit the right to get an 
inheritance, to open a bank account, or even have access to a family’s money. These laws make 
it common for women to make money in the informal market economy and hide the cash in their 
homes, often from their husbands as well, for personal emergency funds. 
(g) Domestic Violence 
The legality of violence or abuse of a family member on another is also defined by PSL. Legal 
abuse of women is in many cases interwoven with guardianship rights, and laws which protect 
women from violence are loosely enforced.12 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
This thesis is working to define the relationship between personal status law and 
economic growth in Arab countries. Originally, I hypothesized that a positive shift in gender 
equity via personal status reform would influence a positive shift in a nation’s economy. 








12 Hassan Yousefi Eshkevari, “Rethinking men’s authority over women: Qiwama, Wilaya and their underlying 
assumptions,” in Gender and Equality in Muslim Family Law: Justice and Ethics in the Islamic Legal Tradition ed. 
Lena Larsen, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Christian Moe, and Kari Vogt (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2013), 191-212.  
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FIGURE 3.1 Theoretical Path from PSL Reform to Economic Growth 
 
As we investigate the competing variables and other possible paths, I explicitly outline my 
theoretical claim that gender equity is the causal mechanism that causes personal status law 
reform to generate economic growth with the following supporting evidence. 
3.1. Effect of Policy on Gender Equity 
Personal Status Law Reforms Support Gender Equity: Looking at the Personal Status 
Law indicators outlined in Chapter 2.2.1, we can identify how a reform of each indicator would 
affect gender equity. PSL indicators Marriage, Domestic Violence, and Legal Status do not 
directly affect women’s economic opportunities, but they significantly affect the appropriate 
representation and treatment of women according to the government. Women’s ability to be her 
own guardian and have legal individuality tells society that she is capable of personal decisions 
and independence. Mobility and Citizenship both can affect a women’s ability to be competitive 
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in the workforce, thus allowing them to have jobs outside the home and make a salary 
independent from the family income. Finally, the most impactful indicators on women’s 
economic growth is Divorce laws and Financial Rights. The ability for a women to maintain 
child custody and receive financial support following a divorce allows for independence and 
opportunities beyond remarriage following a divorce. The concept of the familial finance’s being 
half or even partially belonging to the wife is a impactful and progressive step for women in 
Arab countries who have bound by prior restricting PSL. This leads into financial rights, 
anecdotal evidence supports that women often hand over all money made selling items in the 
informal markets, or they hide stashes of money in their home for personal or emergency use. 
Without financial rights, wives must ask their husbands, and daughters their fathers, for money 
and the permission to use it on their desired transaction, often referenced as a gift and not right, 
even if women are contributing to the household funds. 
The role of women’s autonomy and the role of women in the family are integral in the 
areas of marriage, divorce, and child custody. These cultural norms are often influenced by 
political values and constitutional law.13 Aldosari at the The Gulf Arab States Institute published 
a study in 2016 that claims Personal Status Laws that differ on the basis of sex are a major 
hinderance in the full development of the region. The article exemplifies how vastly PSL varies 
among countries. Yet similarly, there seems to be a systemic opposition to reform of PSL even 
when new laws are formulated and passed, most likely the cultural and historic norms 




13 Aldosari, Hala. The Personal Is Political: Gender Identity in the Personal Status Laws of the Gulf Arab States. 
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 2016. 
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FIGURE 3.1.1 Cycle of Gender Inequity 
 
Turning Islamic teachings into law revokes the freedom of religion for the individual. 
While Islam by no means calls for the oppression of women, the patriarchal history of society 
and family life overshadow the message of Muhammad’s word, which calls for equality of 
people regardless of gender. Many practices exist with the purpose of protecting and revering 
women, NOT to limit their rights. Aldosari conveys a correlation between Islamic rule of law 
and gender inequity, but by no means a direct causation.  It is in agreement across scholars that 
study feminism in Islam that the religion of Islam, the words of the Quran, and the teachings of 
Mohammad are not inherently sexist.1415 Yet the patriarchal norms in the Arab world also 
correlate with gender inequity, thus providing a confounding variable that limits causal claim. 
Aldosari concluded that without women in decision making positions in will be very 
difficult to sustain meaningful change, economic or otherwise.16 Women hold the bigger burden 
of the variation in PSL, because they are often the ones negatively affected. I argue that gender 
 
14 Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce. "Women, Islam, and the Moroccan state: The struggle over the personal status 
law." The Middle East Journal 59, no. 3 (2005): 393-410. 
15 Spierings, N., Smits, J. and Verloo, M., 2009. On the compatibility of Islam and gender equality. Social Indicators 
Research, 90(3), pp.503-522. 
16 Aldosari, Hala. The Personal Is Political: Gender Identity in the Personal Status Laws of the Gulf Arab States. 
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relations and PSL undoubtedly affects the economic growth and development of the region. 
Woman are half the population. Repression of both decision making and creativity of half the 
population is contraindicated to growth of any type. 
Increase in Opportunity for the Growth of Women’s Liberties: M. M. Charrad is the 
leading expert on the relationship between PSL and gender in North Africa. As a Tunisian-born 
multicultural and multilingual researcher of the Maghreb, M. M. Charrad has outlined a strong 
identity of Maghreb women in PSL without painting the concept in black and white. Her 2012 
report for the UN on Family Law Making address PSL in Tunisia and Morocco specifically as 
well as PSL making as a whole. Her research concluded that “woman friendly" reforms are 
important despite the process of initiation, even from top-down in the absence of feminist 
pressures. She stresses the weight of positive PSL reform toward gender equity may not be about 
the law itself, but about how “they generate a new climate in which the next set of debates will 
take place.”17 Charrad supports my causal path that change in social norms cannot proceed the 
expansion of opportunities and instead follows it. 
3.2. Gender Equity and Economic Growth 
Presently, there is little evidence supporting the theory that increased gender equality 
under the law translates into more rapid economic growth. Yet the reversal causal, that economic 
growth makes restrictions of women’s rights costly, has been used to explain the expansion of 
women’s rights in the US.18 This competing argument that the causal path is working in reverse 
 
17 Charrad, Mounira M. "Family law reforms in the Arab world: Tunisia and Morocco." New York (2012). 
18 Geddes, Rick, and Dean Lueck. "The gains from self-ownership and the expansion of women's rights." American 
Economic Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 1079-1092. 
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is contradicted in Dollar and Gatti’s research that found no relation between GDPpc and 
women’s rights on a cross cultural study of over 100 countries.19 
Progression of Social Norms Empower Women to Diversify their Finances: If PSL 
reforms alter our indicators to support gender equity, this opens many doors for women to join 
the national economic system in the formal market. If women can be physically and financially 
independent, this adds another participant to the economic market. Actions like getting a job and 
earning money, spending money, opening a bank account, paying taxes, receiving inheritance, 
divorce settlements or childcare payments, and earning interest all contribute to a country’s 
economy and more participants give the capacity for further growth. The simple use of a dollar 
makes a statement, and reforming PSL to allow for women to use that dollar gives them a voice.  
Economic Growth of Women: A study of land rights on investment and productivity in a 
small town in Ghana concludes that people with stronger political standing or influence would 
have more secure land rights, and those with more secure land rights would put more into their 
fields and yield better economic outcomes. Specifically they found that women’s rights to the 
land was often contested and thus they invested less in land fertility and consequentially yielded 
a lower economic profit. Policies that increase the gender equity of access to economic assets are 
linked with an economic increase for women.20 
Furthermore, mobility restrictions limit the supply of women’s labor participants and 
societal norms limit the demand for female labor.21 While social norms can differ at the 
 
19 Dollar, David, and Roberta Gatti. Gender inequality, income, and growth: are good times good for women?. Vol. 
1. Washington, DC: Development Research Group, The World Bank, 1999. 
20 Goldstein, Markus, and Christopher Udry. "The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural investment in 
Ghana." Journal of political Economy 116, no. 6 (2008): 981-1022. 
21 Morrison, A., Raju, D. and Sinha, N., 2007. Gender equality, poverty and economic growth. The World Bank. 
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household level, law does not, which allows for the economic growth of a nation’s women as a 
whole to increase overtime as norms progress. 
Expansion of National Economic Capacity: In 2013 the World Bank published a paper 
stating a main goal of theirs to promote shared prosperity and reduce poverty worldwide, stating 
“improvement in [shared prosperity] requires growth to be inclusive.”22 It goes on to compare 
economic opportunities and growth between countries and individuals based on demographics 
and social exclusion - specifically stating that the social exclusion of women hinders a country’s 
economic growth. Logically, we can conclude the contrapositive true as well. If the exclusion of 
women from being active participants in the national economy hinders the country’s economic 
growth, then including women as participants in the national economy expands the country’s 
capacity for economic growth. 
Alex Martin also spoke to this on her analysis of the relationship between gender 
inequality in the education system in Morocco and economic growth. Her research indicates 
references the two theoretical pathways of a positive correlation, structuralist and 
modernization.23 Modernization implies that social norms drive society into a constantly 
developing future that propels economic growth by the power of the people. The structuralist 
thought aligns with the argument that laws, systems, and structures existing, such as PSL 
reforms, can lead to opportunity for economic growth.24 My framework agrees with the 
structuralist theory, claiming that the laws bring about the social norms and not vice versa. 
 
22 The World Bank Annual Report 2013. World Bank Annual Report. The World Bank, 2013. 
23 Martin, Jane Alexandra. "Women Empowerment Externalities of the 2004 Moroccan Moudawana Reform: 
Intrafamily Bargaining and Educational Attainment." SMBHC Thesis, University of Mississippi, 2017. 
24 Braunstein, Elissa. "The efficiency of gender equity in economic growth: Neoclassical and feminist 
approaches." GEM-IWG Working Paper (2007): 07-4. 
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National Economic Growth: According to a 2007 World Bank paper on equality and 
economic growth, it is more difficult to convey the existence of this step than the prior ones, 
“micro level effects of gender equality on individual productivity and human development 
outcomes have been well documented and have important ramifications for aggregate economic 
performance, establishing an empirical relationship between gender equality and poverty 
reduction and growth at the macro level has proven to be more challenging.”25 
In 2017 the United Nation’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia 
published a document of the overarching issue of inequality in the Arab region and the effect on 
all seventeen Sustainable Development Goals, stating “Inequality adversely affects the economic 
prosperity and stability of a nation, as increased levels of inequality threaten economic growth 
and prevent its sustainability, and hinder serious attempts to reduce poverty.”26 It goes on the 
argue that as well as hinder poverty reduction, inequalities obstruct civil society, solidarity, 
social justice, human rights, democracy, and promote political unrest, petty crime, and long-
standing conflicts. If inequality of the population is a national issue, it makes equity in the best 
interest of all citizens. 
Basic economic theory argues that growth occurs when the economy has the capacity to 
produce more, often determined by capital, labor, natural resources, and technology it has 
available to produce. In this case adding women as an economic resource would increase capital 
and labor accessible to produce. And because PSL reforms encourage the addition of these 
resources to the supply, these policies lead to economic growth. While confounding and 
extraneous variables exist, many are proven to not affect this relationship conversely to the 
framework. Ruling out competing theories would necessitate individualized research for each 
 
25 Morrison, A., Raju, D. and Sinha, N., 2007. Gender equality, poverty and economic growth. The World Bank. 
26 Nuru-River, Amani. "Inequality in the SDGs." United Nations, Beirut. 2016. 
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theory, and while some exist as mentioned above, it is impossible to conclusively say that my 
framework is true and all other theories are false without investigating every single one. 
 
4. Methodology 
In order to truly analyze the relationship between PSL and economic growth, I will use 
independent case studies of significant change in PSL to investigate for a related change in 
economic growth, using global GDPpc overtime as a control for “normal” GDPpc growth. My 
investigation of gender equity as the causal mechanism toward growth lies in the case studies 
and supplemental data. My thesis will rely on existing GDP data and country case studies on 
PSL reforms in search of a correlation between economic growth and PSL. 
It is important to address that accurate and up-to-date qualitative data on economic 
growth across the Middle East is unavailable due to the refugee crisis and the recent focus on 
women’s inclusion in the discussion of national economic growth. Many PSL reforms either 
occurred near the inception of the country, before the range of reliable empirical economic data 
was collected globally. On the contrary, other PSL reforms occurred so recently that there is not 
good economic data following the reforms to examine for a resulting change in GDPpc. 
Initially, I will select two cases of transformative PSL reform. Case studies were chosen 
based on countries that had a significant change in PSL, in an attempt to investigate for a 
significant change in economic growth. When looking at all Arab Middle Eastern countries that 
have had been governed by a form of Islamic Law, there are many options. Tunisia and Morocco 
both underwent substantial legislative reforms in PSL along with various amendments overtime, 
so the change in indicators can be directly compared to a change in GDPpc. 
  Bring  23 
Quantitatively, I will then run an Unknown Structural Break test on Stata software on 
each case individually to test for any statistically significant changes in growth. Then I will plug 
in each year of PSL reform to a Known Structural Break test for specific possible triggers, as 
well as 1 year, 3 years, and 5 years following the year of the reform. This will give a p-value, 
from which we can estimate the probability that the given year was a statistically significant 
break.27 If the probability that it happened by chance is low, then we can argue that it was indeed 
a structural break and that it is possible the PSL affected this break. We would conclude that it is 
possible that the hypothesis is true, without confirming the causality of the change in growth. 
Qualitatively, I will then analyze the written PSL legislation and the country’s 
implementation of this reform. I will be looking at how long it took for policies to be put in 
place, government systems to shift, and individuals to see changes in their personal status. For 
example, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia gave women the right to drive a car, it took time to 
train women to be driving instructors, and then for them to teach female civilians and to finally 
have female drivers out on the roads. Therefore, if it took three years for a transformative PSL 
reform to trickle down from legislation to the individual citizen, it may be three years following 
the reform that there exists a structural break in economic growth. 
4.1. Case Selection 
 4.1.1. Tunisia: The 1956 Tunisian Law of Personal Status was a significant change in 
legislation for Tunisian personal status law. Since then there have been several amendments that 
can be compared to Tunisian economic growth over the course of changing legislation, which 
makes this is a good example of a large change in PSL as well as some smaller reforms that may 
have also triggered a change in economic growth. Tunisia had reforms to their Code of Personal 
 
27 Stata, 2020. “Tests for structural breaks in time-series data.” Stata.com. 
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Status in 1962, 1964, and 1966 but there is little record of the specifics of these reforms, and 
therefore they are insignificant to my research as they are not transformative PSL reforms.28 I 
will specifically examine the PSL reforms in 1956, 1981, and 1993 and compare for significant 
growth in GDPpc. 
 The 1956 reform “abolished and criminalized polygamy, banned extrajudicial divorce, 
allowed women to file for divorce, gave men and women equal rights with respect to initiating 
divorce and generally expanded women’s rights.”29 This reform was the most extensive of 
Tunisia and affected largely the PSL indicators marriage and divorce. The 1981 reform largely 
affected laws regarding divorce and expanded women’s rights to compensation following a 
divorce. And finally the 1993 law affected a different indicator, it allowed for women to pass 
citizenship on to their children regardless of the father’s nationality. Thus the GDPpc can be 
analyzed for a statistically significant change in growth one, three, and five years following the 
years of the reforms. 
 4.1.2. Morocco: Morocco employed their first PSL in 1957 under the Personal Status 
Code following its decolonization. Then Morocco had legislative reforms in 1993 and then in 
2004 Morocco underwent a significant PSL change entitled the Family Law Reforms. These 
changes were employed to increase the rights of women in Morocco following a reinterpretation 
of Mohammad’s teachings that elevated women.30 This is a clear instance of state defined PSL 
reform for the purpose of gender equity, which allows the dependent variable, economic growth 
 
28 Zeira, Yael. 2013. Memo on Test Cases. “Assessing the Impact of Family Law on Women and Girls in the Islamic 
World.” 
29 Zeira, Yael. 2013. Memo on Test Cases. “Assessing the Impact of Family Law on Women and Girls in the Islamic 
World.” 
30 “The Arab Human Development Report: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World.” Choice Reviews 
Online 44, no. 12 (August 1, 2007): 44-6583-44–6583. 
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to be evaluated for correlation. While their implementation in 1957 did not deviate from previous 
norms, the 1993 and 2004 reforms can be examined for significant growth in GDPpc. 
 The 1993 reform affected PSL regarding marriage and divorce, but not substantially. This 
reform altered the details surrounding a polygamy, guardianship, marriage, and divorce without 
redefining the social contract of women. The 2004 Family Law Reforms “gave adult women the 
right to self-guardianship (regardless of marital status), raised the legal age of marriage for 
Moroccan women to 18 and gave both men and women the right to compose their own marriage 
contracts.”31 Therefore the GDPpc can be analyzed for a statistically significant change in growth 
one, three, and five years following the 1993 and 2004 reforms. 
 
5. Data 
While historic quantitative data is difficult to obtain for economic growth, the Penn 
World Table32 has Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$) for Morocco 
back to 1950 and for Tunisia back to 1960, as seen in CHART 5.1. From this data, we can look 
at the change in GDP overtime and find a structural break, if there is one present, but it is less 
accurate than a true GDP gathered from an international source. Also, while the intention was to 
use GDPpc data, there is only historic national GDP data available dating back to 1950, as 
needed for Tunisia to analyze the 1956 reform. Because this is historical GDP data, I also have 
pulled data from the World Bank33 as a more stable source of information, as seen in CHART 
5.2. While this data set is more accurate, the GDPpc data from world Bank only goes back to 
 
31 Zeira, Yael. 2013. Memo on Test Cases. “Assessing the Impact of Family Law on Women and Girls in the Islamic 
World.” 
32 Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer (2015), "The Next Generation of the Penn World 
Table" American Economic Review, 105(10), 3150-3182. 
33 World Bank. “GDP per capita (current US$),” World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts 
data files. 
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1960 for Morocco and 1965 for Tunisia, which would eliminate the ability to analyze the 1956 
PSL reform in Tunisia. 
CHART 5.1 Real GDP (in mil. 2011US$) Penn World Table 
Real GDP at constant 2011 national prices (in mil. 2011US$) 
Year Morocco Tunisia Year Morocco Tunisia Year Morocco Tunisia 
1950    16,709    1973    47,497  20,899  1996  121,362  60,553  
1951    16,920    1974    50,148  22,582 1997  118,658  63,847  
1952    17,744    1975    53,938  24,196  1998  127,765  67,016  
1953    18,609    1976    59,766  26,107  1999  128,441  71,048  
1954    19,040    1977    63,381  26,995  2000  130,487  74,103  
1955    17,776    1978    64,805  28,736  2001  140,341  77,697  
1956    18,121    1979    67,916  30,622  2002  144,995  79,017 
1957    17,432    1980    70,786  32,891  2003  154,154  83,340  
1958    19,438    1981    68,827  34,707  2004  161,556  88,306  
1959    19,952   1982    75,448  34,540  2005  166,368  91,838  
1960    20,400  8,542 1983    75,028  36,156  2006  179,278  97,031  
1961    24,529  8,800  1984    78,276  38,228  2007  184,129  103,099  
1962    28,232  8,944  1985    83,225  40,392  2008  195,036  107,697  
1963    32,720  9,923  1986    89,970  39,584  2009  212,524  111,059  
1964    34,403  10,304  1987    87,735  41,526  2010  220,957  114,346  
1965    34,291  10,696  1988    96,983  42,200  2011  234,817  112,153  
1966    33,034  11,027  1989    99,390  43,661  2012  240,213  116,528  
1967    34,538  11,011  1990  103,250  46,750  2013  252,035  119,217  
1968    36,827  11,949  1991  110,425  48,575  2014  262,146  122,074  
1969    40,530  12,463  1992  105,973  52,367  2015  275,074  123,523  
1970    42,393  16,243  1993  104,900  53,512  2016  284,093  124,775  
1971    44,123  17,865  1994  115,766  55,215  2017  299,993  127,214  
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CHART 5.2 GDP per capita World Bank 
  GDP per capita (current US$)   GDP per capita (current US$) 
Year Morocco Tunisia World Year Morocco Tunisia World 
1960 164.801   451.74 1990 1206.01 1491.12 4285.24 
1961 158.924   463.83 1991 1266.85 1551.38 4464.65 
1962 181.183   489.55 1992 1299.42 1799.11 4668.24 
1963 196.531   516.62 1993 1199.32 1660.88 4669.58 
1964 201.262   554.55 1994 1326.94 1743.15 4939.83 
1965 206.449 217.911 591.72 1995 1432.31 1975.9 5412.34 
1966 196.315 224.295 628.74 1996 1561.13 2113.59 5453.31 
1967 202.857 229.029 655.87 1997 1396.77 2208.21 5357.07 
1968 212.751 250.694 693.9 1998 1472.39 2292.71 5272.63 
1969 232.126 260.408 749.73 1999 1447.97 2386.59 5395.94 
1970 246.016 284.22 803.95 2000 1334.94 2211.83 5498.33 
1971 265.208 325.564 870.44 2001 1339.29 2253.04 5396.89 
1972 302.564 422.856 984.53 2002 1416.49 2344.41 5533.43 
1973 364.636 504.828 1178.09 2003 1725.46 2760.41 6131.22 
1974 439.012 641.105 1332.8 2004 1952.9 3111.38 6820.62 
1975 502.757 765.189 1457.15 2005 2018.03 3193.21 7297.15 
1976 524.179 779.045 1556.82 2006 2196.01 3370.03 7811.94 
1977 590.232 863.067 1729.53 2007 2499.26 3775.75 8694.9 
1978 690.171 984.801 2005.11 2008 2890.36 4307.16 9423.76 
1979 809.628 1157.38 2288.67 2009 2866.92 4128.46 8830.31 
1980 1078.84 1371.84 2532.76 2010 2839.93 4141.98 9551.34 
1981 861.798 1286.55 2576.69 2011 3046.95 4264.67 10488.33 
1982 836.436 1206.64 2507.32 2012 2912.66 4152.68 10605.21 
1983 750.022 1203.66 2513.13 2013 3121.68 4222.7 10781.86 
1984 668.385 1156.91 2561 2014 3171.7 4305.47 10952.34 
1985 660.947 1147.43 2643.76 2015 2875.26 3861.69 10246.51 
1986 840.011 1199.56 3069.91 2016 2897.66 3698.06 10281.91 
1987 920.592 1259.14 3431.58 2017 3036.17 3482.19 10817.48 
1988 1066.33 1281.2 3772.4 2018 3237.88 3447.51 11374.85 
1989 1071.18 1253.33 3870.41 World Bank national accounts data 
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6. Data Analysis 
6.1. Stata Results 
An Unknown Structural Break test conveys an unnatural break in the trend of data. The 
data analysis program I used, Stata, is programmed to calculate an unknown structural break for 
the user. After downloading the desired data, we used the ‘regress’ command to take a linear 
regression of the data: 
Regress [data name], vce(robust) 
Or using the World Bank data set we compare it to the global average GDPpc to get a linear 
regression that conveys an abnormal break from the economic growth. 
Regress [data name] [world data], vce(robust) 
This takes all the data points and places a “line of best fit” along the graph and tells the user how 
strongly the data stays close to that line. Then we test for an unknown structural break, which 
looks at the data as a whole and finds a break from the trend. We start by setting the unit of time 
as a year with ‘tsset’ and the running the unknown break test with ‘estat.’  
Tsset year 
Estat sbsingle 
The Unknown Structural Break test tells us the probability that the Null Hypothesis (H0) is true, 
meaning the probability that there is no structural break in the data. Running this test gets us 
results as seen in CHART 6.1.1-6.1.4. Test for a structural break tells us if it is known or 
unknown. Number of obs. Tells us how many data points we are analyzing, with the full sample 
conveying which entries those are. The trimmed sample removes outliers from the ends of the 
data points. The estimated break date tells us Stata’s calculated data of structural break. And 
finally the p-value is the probability of observing a break in the data if the Null Hypothesis is 
true (there is no break). Therefore when the p-value is small, for example less than 0.05 (95% 
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significance level), it suggests that the observed data is sufficiently inconsistent with the null 
hypothesis and that the null hypothesis may be rejected. So in the case of our research – we infer 
that this year may be a possible break in the data. 
 First, we look for an unknown break in Tunisia using our data from the Penn World 
Table. Looking at CHART 6.1.1 we see that the p-value is 0.0000 for an estimated break date of 
2007, telling us it is extremely possible there is a break in the Tunisian GDP in 2007. Now these 
breaks are not always clear, with the 2007 date marked on GRAPH 6.1.1. While 1993 is still 
considered the largest reform in PSL in Tunisian history, the Chambers of Deputies adopted two 
projects that strengthened support for mother’s caring for children and raised the minimum 
marriage age to 18 for both sexes. Logically, it seems unlikely that this would cause an 
immediate break in the data trend, so I conclude that this break is likely not connected to PSL 
reform. 
CHART 6.1.1 Tunisia, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date 
Test for a structural break:  Unknown break date 
Number of obs = 58 
Full sample: 11  - 68 
Trimmed sample: 20 - 60 
Estimated break date: 2007 
Ho: No structural break 
Test Statistic p-value 
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GRAPH 6.1.1 Tunisia, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date 
 
 When we run the Unknown Break Test for Morocco, we again get a p-value of 0.0000 for 
an estimated break date of 2007, telling us it is extremely possible there is a break in the 
Morocco GDP in 2007 as well as seen in CHART 6.1.2 and the date marked on GRAPH 6.1.2. 
This is interesting as it is three years following the major PSL reforms of 2004 that meant to 
modernize women’s roles in Moroccan law while remaining aligned with Islamic teachings, 
“The reforms attempted to reconcile the existing Mudawana with international standards of 
human rights, adhering to Islamic tenets of justice and reason while remaining receptive to the 
requirements of progress and modernity.”34 Thus any implementation of the reforms that 
disseminated over those three years could have contributed to a break in the trend of GDP 





34 Charrad, Mounira M. "Family law reforms in the Arab world: Tunisia and Morocco." New York (2012). 
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CHART 6.1.2 Morocco, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date 
Test for a structural break:  Unknown break date 
Number of obs = 58 
Full sample: 1  - 68 
Trimmed sample: 12 – 58 
Estimated break date: 2007 
Ho: No structural break 
Test Statistic p-value 
swald 188.0611 0.0000 
 
GRAPH 6.1.2 Morocco, Penn World Table, Unknown Break Date 
 
 
 The historical GDP data has been estimated overtime, and thus appears to smooth the 
growth curve substantially more that the actual GDPpc data we have available from the World 
Bank. When we run the unknown structural break test for Tunisia’s GDPpc, we get a 0.0000 p-
value for a break at 1981. This was the year of the first major reform in Tunisian PSL since 
1956, but it is unlikely that would cause an immediate break in the growth rate. Also, as seen in 
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GRAPH 6.1.3, it appears as though there is a minor decrease in GDPpc before the growth 
increases again, so the break detected could be a negative break, again for unknown reasons. 
CHART 6.1.3 Tunisia, World Bank, Unknown Break Date 
Test for a structural break:  Unknown break date 
Number of obs = 54 
Full sample: 6  - 59 
Trimmed sample: 15 - 51 
Estimated break date: 1981 
Ho: No structural break 
Test Statistic p-value 
swald 148.8993 0.0000 
 
GRAPH 6.1.3 Tunisia, World Bank, Unknown Break Date 
 
 
On the other hand, when we run the unknown structural break test for Morocco we get a 
break date at 2007 again with a p-value of 0.0000. This p-value strongly infers the likelihood of a 
significant break in the data. This aligns with the prior unknown structural break test run on the 
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historical data in CHART 6.1.2 and the Mudawana reforms of 2004. Charrad’s research of this 
conveyed a delay in implementation of the new laws by judges as well as a lack of awareness of 
the reforms among the public, pointing to a possible reason for a lag in economic effect. 
CHART 6.1.4 Morocco, World Bank, Unknown Break Date 
Test for a structural break:  Unknown break date 
Number of obs = 59 
Full sample: 1  - 59 
Trimmed sample: 10 - 51 
Estimated break date: 2007 
Ho: No structural break 
Test Statistic p-value 
swald 21.1539 0.0000 
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6.2. Case Studies 
6.2.1. Tunisia: To test the theory that PSL reforms affect economic growth enough for a 
statistical significant break in the data, we run a known structural break test for the year of the 
reform, one year later, three years later, and five years later. We do this following the ‘tsset’ 
command using: 
Estat sbknown, break(target year) 
The results, as seen in CHART 6.2.1, convey a p-value of 0.0000 in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 
1994, 1996, and 1998 at a 95% confidence level. First of all, this is extremely unlikely that there 
are seven statistically significant breaks in a 54 variable data set. While one or two of these may 
have some grounds, there is no mathematical explanation for all of these to be break dates. 
That being said, it is possible that 1981 is a break date as seen in the unknown structural 
break test in CHART 6.1.3. There could also possibly be break between 1993 and 1998, but the 
data is too inconclusive to determine a break. GRAPH 6.2.1 conveys a stronger jump in GDPpc 
in the mid 2000’s, but there is no reform in PSL there to analyze. Despite the lack of consistency 
in the data, Charrad concludes that 1993 reform in family legislation has made small incidents of 
positive change in women’s equity without making a truly significant change. It is possible that 
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CHART 6.2.1 Tunisia, World Bank, Known Break Date 
Test for a structural break:  Known break date       
Number of obs = 54               
Sample: 1965 - 2018        
Ho: No structural break       
Break date: 1981 1982 1984 1986 1993 1994 1996 1998 
Chi2 = 148.8 112.99 86.91 38.39 4.55 8.26 22.52 20.34 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.016 0.000 0.000 
 
GRAPH 6.2.1 Tunisia, World Bank, Known Break Date 
 
6.2.2. Morocco: When we run the known structural break test on the Moroccan PSL 
reforms for the year of the reform, one year later, three years later, and five years later, he 
results, as seen in CHART 6.2.2, convey a p-value of 0.0000 in 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2004, 
2005, 2007, and 2009 at a 95% confidence level. This would make all eight tested years a 
statistically significant break in the GDPpc growth overtime which would be a statistical 
anomaly. 
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Beyond the issues in the execution in known structural break test, Morocco’s PSL 
reforms align with both unknown structural break tests. The 2004 reforms were the greatest 
change in Morocco legislatively, but the observable affects were limited. Judges who had been 
practicing using prior Shari’a law, may be reluctant to change to the modern teachings and rule 
in favor of the reform. It is clear that if the state’s population doesn’t support a PSL reform, it is 
much less likely to be impactful on the nation regardless of contents of the reform. 
CHART 6.2.2 Morocco, World Bank, Known Break Date 
Test for a structural break:  Known break date       
Number of obs = 59               
Sample: 1960 - 2018        
Ho: No structural break       
Break date: 1993 1994 1996 1998 2004 2005 2007 2009 
Chi2 = 28.91 24.50 22.54 22.91 24.45 18.83 21.15 12.34 
Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.002 
 
GRAPH 6.2.2 Morocco, World Bank, Known Break Date 
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7. Conclusion 
 Without the ability to analyze every country and case individually, I am not able to 
determine an accurate causal relationship between personal status law and economic growth 
without confounding variables. Most elements of gender inequity in a country, whether health, 
education, or law affect one another and intertwine such that unravelling individual causal 
relationships is impossible. Analysis of personal status law and economic growth is an attempt to 
separate out just one correlation, but this limits the lengths to which I can draw conclusions. 
Also, the cultural climate, or public opinion of the rights of women and personal status law of 
women in a country might also be a confounding variable that affects this relationship. 
Even comparing GDP growth graphs of countries with significant change in PSL against 
countries without a significant change in PSL is not without limitations as we cannot produce a 
controlled counterexample for a country case study. Therefore the true downfall of this thesis lies 
in the inability to determine the truth of the past without an attempt to replicate it in the future. 
The other major shortcoming of this thesis is data analysis anomalies in the known 
structural break test. A deep dive search of Stata resources and statistical structural break 
analysis was inconclusive of a solution to better compare GDPpc and PSL. If this research were 
to be replicated a new method of data analytics is recommended, or a different statistical 
program altogether. 
Altogether, the qualitative evidence better supports a strong positive correlation between 
personal status law reforms and economic growth. The quantitative data shows some promise of 
a correlation in Morocco but less of a relation in Tunisia. Overall, this compilation or research 
does not disprove the hypothesis that progressive PSL reforms affects a growth in national GDP 
via gender equity, but it certainly does not strongly support it. The greater presence of anecdotal 
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evidence than mathematical proof is a major concern in any scientific argument. While this may 
not be a causal relationship, the economic growth and gender equity and unarguable positive 
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